CHRIS RANALLI
  • Home
  • Publications
  • Teaching
  • Public philosophy
  • Presentations
  • Contact

Publications

Recent work on Skepticism in Epistemology
American Philosophical Quarterly


What's so bad about Echo chambers?
Inquiry
(co-authored with Finlay Malcolm)

Normativity in Studying Conspiracy Theory Belief
Philosophical Psychology
(co-authored with Nora Kindermann and Rik Peels)

Knowledge of Things and Aesthetic Testimony
Inquiry

The Special Value of Experience
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind

Closed-minded Belief and Indoctrination
American Philosophical Quarterly


Deep Disagreement 1: Theories of Deep Disagreement
Philosophy Compass
(co-authored with Thirza Lagewaard)

Deep Disagreement 2: Epistemology of Deep Disagreement
Philosophy Compass
(co-authored with Thirza Lagewaard)

Political Hinge Epistemology
Extending Hinge Epistemology (Anthem Press)
(Book link)

Common sense and Ontological Commitment
Cambridge Companion to Common-sense Philosophy (Cambridge University Press)
(co-authored with J. de Ridder)

The Puzzle of Philosophical Testimony
European Journal of Philosophy

Moral Hinges and Steadfastness
Metaphilosophy (special issue on disagreement)

Collective Ignorance: An Information Theoretic Account
Synthese
(co-authored with R. van Woudenberg)

Rationally Maintaining a Worldview
Social Epistemology Review & Reply Collective (SERRC)

Color, Skepticism and Epistemology
Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Color
(co-authored with D. Pritchard)

Deep Disagreement and Hinge Epistemology
Synthese

What is Deep Disagreement?
Topoi (special issue on disagreement)

Are There Heavyweight Perceptual Reasons?
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, special issue on G. Schönbaumsfeld's The Illusion of Doubt (Oxford University Press)

On Metaepistemological Scepticism
Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism (Oxford University Press)
(co-authored with D. Pritchard)

Putnam on BIV's and Radical Skepticism
The Brain in a Vat (Cambridge University Press)
(co-authored with D. Pritchard)

Luck, Propositional Perception, and the Entailment Thesis
Synthese

Revisionism, Skepticism and the Non-belief Theory of Hinge commitments
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

Skepticism and Disjunctivism
Skepticism: from Antiquity to the Present (Bloomsbury)
(co-authored with D. Pritchard) (PDF unpublished version)

Epistemological Disjunctivism and Introspective Indiscriminability
Philosophia

Metaepistemological skepticism
Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy (Oxford University Press)


In preparation

Echo chambers and Extreme beliefs
Extreme Beliefs: Mapping the Terrain, in R. Peels & J. Horgan (eds.) Oxford University Press (with Finlay Malcom)

Believing against the Evidence: the case for personal commitment
Attitude in Philosophy, in S. Goldberg & M. Walker (eds.) Oxford University Press

Tribalistic belief and Alienation
(committed for a Routledge volume on political epistemology)

Weaponizing Conspiracy Theories
(committed for an Oxford University Press volume on misinformation)

Blame and criticism for Wrongful Hinges
(committed for a special issue on Wittgenstein and deep moral disagreement)

The Philosophy of Indoctrination: Epistemology, Ethics, & Politics
(in preparation for Routledge)

Extreme beliefs and Responsibility
(edited volume, in preparation for an Oxford University Press series on extreme beliefs)

Public Audience Writing

Erasing Consciousness
Institute of Art and Ideas

'Indoctrination' as Propaganda
The Philosophers' Magazine

Moore's Proof of an External World
1000-word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology

Socializing Epistemic Autonomy
Open for Debate

Wittgenstein and Deep Disagreement
The Philosophers' Magazine

Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate someone?
1000-word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology





Powered by Create your own unique website with customizable templates.
  • Home
  • Publications
  • Teaching
  • Public philosophy
  • Presentations
  • Contact